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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE
a court had the power to appoint a guardian ad litem prior to
the commencement of an action.
The original draft of rule 1202 provided that a motion for
the appointment of a guardian ad litem could be made "to the
court in which the action is brought at any stage in an action,
or to the court in which the action is about to be brought."
82
The Revisers after changing this clear and unequivocal lan-
guage to its present form, indicated that the change in language
was not intended to effect any change in meaning.8 3 Thus the
court's interpretation of rule 1202 appears consistent with its
legislative history.
PLEADINGS
Liberal Construction of Pleadings- Foley v. D'Agostino
The December 1963 Survey expressed hope that the courts
would give prompt and unambiguous indication that the CPA's
pleading technicalities would not be permitted to encumber the
CPLR; and that their inquiry on a motion to dismiss a pleading for
failure to state a cause of action would be only that - i.e., whether
it states a cause of action- without regard to any prior-law notions
that often laid more stress on form than on substance.
Such indication was soon forthcoming. In Foley v. D'Agos-
tino,8 4 the appellate division, first department, sustained a comnlaint
that would in all likelihood have been dismissed under the CPA. It
examined in depth the intent of the Revisers and treated in per-
spective the several provisions of the CPLR from which the new
pleading requirements are culled.
The decision is the outstanding one on pleadings under the
CPLR and, unless the Court of Appeals itself indicates otherwise,
it appears destined to remain the judicial foundation for the bar's
use of Article 30 of the CPLR. In an extensive and unanimous
opinion by Justice Eager, a number of CPLR provisions are
treated, including those which lie at the heart of CPLR pleading:
section 3013, rule 3014 and section 3026.
The case speaks for itself, and with an authority that only
judicial determination can command. To paraphrase it here would
not be helpful, and to quote only portions of it would be an
secured an appointment of a guardian ad litem before instituting the action) ;
In re O'Malley's Trust, 286 App. Div. 869, 142 N.Y.S.2d 21 (2d Dep't 1955)
(wherein the court indicated that it was a proper exercise of discretion for
a court to appoint a guardian prior to the adjourned return day of order
to show cause).
82 SECOND REP. 375.
8 3 FlyrH REP. 334.
84 (App. Div. 1st Dep't), 151 N.Y.L.J., April 13, 1964, p. 1, col. 1.
1964 ]
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incomplete treatment. The practitioner is urged to read the case
thoroughly. His pleading burdens may be substantially relieved if
he keeps in mind the admonitory words that Foley directs at
anyone who would ask the court to dismiss the pleading upon any
showing that does not manifest how its defects-whatever they be
- prejudice him. If Foley is adhered to, the fear of the pleading
draftsmen will be a thing of the past so long as the pleading gives
basic notice to the other party of what it is that the pleader
complains of.
Hypothetical Pleading - Indemnity
In a recent case,8 5 a retailer brought an action against a doll
manufacturer for breach of an implied warranty of merchantability.
The plaintiff alleged that he was being sued in Connecticut on
behalf of an infant who sustained an eye injury while playing with
a doll purchased in one of the plaintiff's stores. The complaint
indicated that the retailer had denied the allegations in the Con-
necticut suit, but that if liability should be adjudged against plaintiff
(as defendant in that suit), he would be entitled to be indemnified
by the doll manufacturer because ultimate fault would be in its
breach of implied warranty in the manufacture of said doll. The
appellate division, in reversing the lower court decision, held that
the complaint was sufficient to state a cause of action for breach of
implied warranty even though the cause of action was hypo-
thetically pleaded.
86
At common law hypothetical pleadings were subject to demur-
rer on the grounds of indefiniteness and uncertainty.8 7 Even under
the CPA, hypothetical pleadings were frowned upon by the
courts, 8 with bur few exceptions.89 The court in the instant case
read quite liberally Rule 3014 of the CPLR, which permits
causes of action or defenses to be pleaded hypothetically. It sus-
tained the complaint even though it did not unequivocally assert
a present breach of the warranty. The court merely subjected
the hypothetical pleading to a "good faith" test and found that
the existence or non-existence of the breach was a fact concerning
which the plaintiff had pleaded with "honesty and good faith." 9'
85 W. T. Grant Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co., supra note 71.
8 Id. at 362-63, 243 N.Y.S.2d at 430-31.
87 Stroock Publishing Co. v. Talcott, 129 App. Div. 14, 113 N.Y. Supp.
214 (2d Dep't 1908).
88General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Bayer Co., 305 N.Y. 479, 113 N.E.2d
844 (1953); Lazar v. Steinberg, 269 App. Div. 760, 54 N.Y.S.2d 859 (2d
Dep't 1945).
89 Polstein v. Smith, 239 App. Div. 724, 268 N.Y. Supp. 617 (1st Dep't
1934); R & L Goldmuntz Sprl v. Fischer, 57 N.Y.S.2d 489 (Sup. Ct.
1945).
90 W. T. Grant Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co., supra note 71, at 363, 243
N.Y.S.2d at 430-31.
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